5月25日，万锦市副市长陈国治向安省法院正式提出法律诉讼。诉讼对象为加拿大安全情报局（Canadian Security Intelligence Service，简称CSIS）、CSIS局长大卫·维尼奥（David Vigneault）、CSIS泄密者以及媒体人Sam Cooper和Fife。
原文如下（后附中文翻译，仅供参考）：
STATEMENT OF CLAIM
TO THE DEFENDANTS
A LEGAL PROCEEDING HAS BEEN COMMENCED AGAINST YOU by the Plaintiff.
The claim made against you is set out in the following pages.
IF YOU WISH TO DEFEND THIS PROCEEDING, you or an Ontario lawyer acting for
you must prepare a Statement of Defence in Form 18A prescribed by the Rules of Civil Procedure,
serve it on the Plaintiff’s lawyer or, where the Plaintiff does not have a lawyer, serve it on the
Plaintiff, and file it, with proof of service, in this court office, WITHIN TWENTY DAYS after
this Statement of Claim is served on you, if you are served in Ontario.
If you are served in another province or territory of Canada or in the United States of
America, the period for serving and filing your statement of defence is forty days. If you are served
outside Canada and the United States of America, the period is sixty days.
Instead of serving and filing a Statement of Defence, you may serve and file a notice of
intent to defend in Form 18B prescribed by the Rules of Civil Procedure. This will entitle you to
ten more days within which to serve and file your statement of defence.
IF YOU FAIL TO DEFEND THIS PROCEEDING, JUDGMENT MAY BE GIVEN
AGAINST YOU IN YOUR ABSENCE AND WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE TO YOU. IF
YOU WISH TO DEFEND THIS PROCEEDING BUT ARE UNABLE TO PAY LEGAL FEES,
LEGAL AID MAY BE AVAILABLE TO YOU BY CONTACTING A LOCAL LEGAL AID
OFFICE.
IF YOU PAY THE PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM, and $1,000.00 for costs, within the time for
serving and filing your statement of defence, you may move to have this proceeding dismissed by
the court. If you believe the amount claimed for costs is excessive, you may pay the plaintiff’s
claim and $400.00 for costs and have the costs assessed by the court.
TAKE NOTICE: THIS ACTION WILL AUTOMATICALLY BE DISMISSED if it has
not been set down for trial or terminated by any means within five years after the action was
commenced unless otherwise ordered by the court.
CLAIM
1. The Plaintiff’s claim is for:
(a) as against the defendants, general and aggravated damages in the amount of
$9,000,000;
(b) as against John Doe (“Doe”), Jane Smith (“Smith”), Sam Cooper (“Cooper”) and
Robert Fife (“Fife”) punitive damages in the amount of $1,000,000;
(c) pre-judgement and post-judgement interest in accordance with the Courts of Justice
Act, R.S.O. 1990, c C43, as amended;
(d) his costs of this action on a substantial indemnity basis plus HST on such costs; and
(e) such further and other relief as this Court may deem just.
A. OVERVIEW
2. As set out below, commencing from at least November 2022 through to May 2023, John
Doe and Jane Smith (employees of the Government of Canada with access to classified
information and documents) have with the assistance and encouragement of certain members of
the press engaged in a protracted campaign of repeatedly violating the provisions of the Security
of Information Act by unlawfully disclosing (i.e. leaking) classified information. They have done
so (and the Defendants Cooper and Fife have encouraged and induced them to do so) knowing that
their unlawful actions would cause harm to Canadian politicians of Chinese ancestry, such as
Michael Chan, who have been the target of such leaks. They (and the Defendants Cooper and
Fife) have leaked such information knowing that such information is often a result of conjecture
and subjective interpretation and that this information, looked at in isolation, might be misleading
They have done so in an effort to advance their interests over the broader interests of Canada and
without regard to the very significant harm that would be caused to Michael Chan by their illegal
actions.
B. The Parties
(i) The Plaintiff
3. The Plaintiff, Michael Chan (“Chan”), is a Councillor in York Region and Deputy Mayor
of the City of Markham. He was formerly a Member of the Legislative Assembly of the Province
of Ontario. He was first elected as the Member for Markham-Unionville in 2007 and was reelected three times since then. He was first appointed a cabinet minister in the Ontario Government
in February, 2007 and had honourably served in several cabinet portfolios.
4. Chan was born in China and in his youth lived in Hong Kong and Macau. He came to
Canada as a young man seeking a better life. He spoke no English and initially worked hard to
establish himself in his new country. Eventually, through hard work and determination, he would
become a successful businessman. He found that better life. He is one example of the millions of
Canadian immigrants, who over the last several decades, have prospered in this country and,
through their efforts, have helped this country prosper.
(ii) The Government Defendants
5. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (“CSIS”) is a government agency created by
the Canadian Security Intelligence Act, R.S.C. 1984 (the “CSIS Act”), as amended. Its function
is to assist in protecting Canada’s national security and it is required to perform its duties and
functions in accordance with the rule of law and in a manner that respects the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
6. The Defendant, David Vigneault (“Vigneault”), is the Director of CSIS and has the control
and management of CSIS and all matters connected therewith, including the oversight of its
employees and employment-related policies.
7. His Majesty the King in Right of Canada (the “Crown”) is the legal entity that is
responsible for torts committed by the agents and servants (including employees) of the Crown
pursuant to section 3 of The Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-50.
8. The Attorney General of Canada is added as a Defendant pursuant to section 23 of The
Crown Liability and Proceedings Act.
9. The true names and identities of the Defendants Doe and Smith are not known to Chan.
The pseudonyms are used until their identities are determined.
10. Doe and Smith were employees of CSIS at the relevant times and were “public officers”.
A significant and essential part of their employment is creating, reviewing and disseminating (in
accordance with law) secret official information. In the course of such employment they had
access to and came into possession of information pertaining to certain CSIS investigations, as set
out below.
11. Pursuant to section 10 of the CSIS Act, Doe and Smith have made and are bound by
statutory oaths of secrecy by which they have promised:
I, [name], swear that I will not, without due authority, disclose or
make known to any person any information acquired by me by
reason of the duties performed by me on behalf of or under the
direction of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service or by reason
of any office or employment held by me pursuant to the Canadian
Security Intelligence Service Act. So help me God.
12. In the alternative to paragraphs 10-11, Doe and Smith were employees of other branches
of the Canadian Government with access to CSIS generated reports and secret official information.
(iii) The Defendants Cooper and Fife
13. The Defendant Sam Cooper (“Cooper”) is an online investigative journalist for Global
News. Over the past few years, Cooper has endeavoured to establish himself as being an expert
on Chinese-Canadian matters and, in particular, on alleged efforts by the Chinese government to
exert improper influences in Canadian society. Cooper has also appeared on many podcasts or
other broadcasts espousing these views.
14. Cooper has often repeated as truth, unverified information coming from persons affiliated
with, or who claim to be affiliated with, western intelligence sources. This, in turn, has assisted
him to cultivate relationships with individuals employed in or who deal with the Canadian
intelligence community, as well as those who may want a public platform to advance theories or
suspicions they believe or espouse.
15. Fife is an employee of The Globe and Mail. He has also cultivated relationships with
individuals employed in or who deal with the Canadian intelligence community and has in the past
been a conduit used by them to report leaked (and inaccurate) classified information. Fife has a
history of acting as a conduit for illegally leaked classified (and false) information. In particular,
the judicial commission for Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Government Officials in relation
to Maher Arar found that “over an extended period of time, classified information about” a
Canadian citizen “was selectively leaked to the media by Canadian (intelligence) officials” to the
media and that the press had repeated this information as being apparently credible. The “media” referred to in this judicial report included leaks received and repeated by Fife knowing that they
were illegal.
C. BACKGROUND FACTS
(i) CSIS’ past treatment of Michael Chan
16. As an organisation, CSIS is legally required to be apolitical and its public officials are
required to comply with the statutory oath of secrecy, and with the Security of Information Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. O-5 (the “Security of Information Act”), including Section 4(1)(a), which makes
it an offence to communicate to others secret official information that has been entrusted to it.
17. The nature of the intelligence gathering activities of CSIS is that it often receives
information about Canadian citizens that is based on rumour and innuendo or other information of
questionable probative value and which would not be admissible in a court of law. Further, certain
sources of information may have private or political agendas or views which raise issues with
respect to the trustworthiness of information they provide. Finally, the information is distilled in
an inherently subjective process.
18. CSIS generated information or reports may thus often be frail and suspect. It is therefore
important that this information be handled with the utmost of care and held in the strictest of
confidence. The reality is that if CSIS generated information is published, unofficially released
or otherwise leaked to the general public, significant prejudice and harm could result both to the
broader interest of Canada and to those in which such information may pertain by implication, or
otherwise. Moreover, a cross section of the public will tend to believe such information to be
factually credible given its stated association to CSIS.
19. The secrecy and non-communication provisions embedded in the statutory oath of secrecy,
and in the Security of Information Act, among other things provides protection for Canadian
citizens that they will not be harmed by CSIS or other government officials communicating official
information or any of CSIS’ views based on its investigative information.
20. This has not always been the case. CSIS and other public officials (including senior
officials) have sometimes intentionally breached legal requirements in an effort to advance
personal views and interests, or the views, interests and agendas of others.
21. In particular, in 2010, the then director of CSIS, Richard Fadden (“Fadden”), publicly
spread a vague, general innuendo to the effect that CSIS had information that some (unnamed)
Canadian cabinet minister(s), who were born outside of Canada, were believed to be under the
influence of a foreign government (with the implication that this foreign government was China).
22. Chan at that time was a Minister in the Ontario Cabinet.
23. Fadden cavalierly casting aspersions on Canadian politicians who had immigrated from
China was widely condemned, including by the press which called it “foolish”, “reckless” and
“contradictory”. It was found by the relevant Parliamentary oversight committee (the “Standing
Committee on Public Safety and National Security”) that “Fadden sowed doubts and created
anxiety through his unsubstantiated allegations. In the Committee’s opinion, Mr. Fadden seriously
damaged the reputation of elected officials in Canada.”
24. The Parliamentary Committee therefore recommended that Fadden be fired.
25. Stung by this public censure and not willing to abandon unfounded beliefs, in 2015 an
unidentified CSIS official (or ex-official) in violation of the law told The Globe and Mail that one
of the politicians referenced in 2010 by Fadden as allegedly being under “foreign influence” was Michael Chan. As intended, The Globe and Mail proceeded in 2015 to then publish articles that
suggested the CSIS information was credible and implied that Chan was some sort of threat to
Canada.
26. Again, no evidence was ever presented to support this unsupported 2015 innuendo. CSIS
never interviewed Chan, and Chan’s name was simply smeared by CSIS with the press as a willing
conduit.
(ii) Doe and Smith: Unlawful Acts and Misfeasance in Public Office
27. In late 2022/early 2023, Doe and Smith decided to repeat the tactic previously used by
some CSIS or other government of Canada employees to go after Canadian politicians of Chinese
ethnicity.
28. As public officers, Doe and Smith were at all times were subject to and bound by the
Security of Information Act, which makes it an offence to communicate to others secret official
information that has been entrusted in confidence to them by any person holding office under His
Majesty, or owing to their position as a person who holds or has held office under His Majesty.
29. Doe and Smith were aware of their statutory oath of secrecy and the provisions of the
Security of Information Act, but intentionally breached both provisions in their actions set out
below. In doing so, they committed unlawful acts.
30. In particular, Doe and Smith deliberately communicated to, and shared with members of
the press, secret official information about the existence of CSIS investigations relating to alleged
activities of the Chinese government, its alleged interaction with Canadian politicians of Chinese
ethnicity, and classified briefings to the Canadian government on such issues.
31. Doe and Smith then proceeded to identify to the press a number of specific Canadian
politicians of Chinese ethnicity as individually being allegedly the subject of CSIS investigations
and to report (inaccurately) on their alleged actions. They did so with the intent that this would generate publicity and sow uncertainty in the minds of the Canadian public as to whether these politicians could be trusted.
32. By February, 2023 the illegal actions of Doe and Smith in leaking secret official
information to Cooper of Global News had helped plant in the minds of the public that CSIS was of the view that the Chinese Government had given $250,000 in cash to (Liberal) candidates for public office, that there was a “network” of “operatives” in the Greater Toronto Area that was advancing the goals of the Chinese Communist party and that Chinese “agents” were assisting
Canadian candidates for political office.
33. Against this general background of alleged widespread illegal interference by a foreign
government through (initially unnamed) operatives, Doe and Smith then directly targeted Chan in
their leaks.
34. Doe and Smith shared CSIS intelligence information with the intent that such information
would be re-published by the press and that this would both personally and reputationally harm
Chan – a person they (incorrectly) were of the view was somehow disloyal to or a threat to Canada.
35. More broadly, their actions were influenced by a stereotypical type-casting of immigrants
born in China as being somehow untrustworthy.
36. As part of their broader attack on Canadian-Chinese politicians, Doe and Smith chose to
deliberately communicate (either individually or collectively) about Chan:
(a) to Fife of The Globe and Mail the (unfounded and inaccurate) view of certain
segments of CSIS to the effect that Chan was improperly associating with persons
who might be “intelligence actors” on behalf of the government of China on matters that were “election–related”, and that Chan had been mentioned in (classified) intelligence briefings to the federal government;
(b) to Cooper of Global News that: (i) Chan was a “target of CSIS”, (ii) that CSIS’
information was that Chan was a “political kingmaker” of the Liberal party and had
(in an unspecified manner) “orchestrated” the removal of a candidate for
nomination in a federal riding and to replace him with a candidate that allegedly
was favoured by the Chinese government, (iii) that Chan had provided
(unspecified) “political information” to the Chinese consulate in Toronto, and (iv)
that Chan’s actions threatened Canadian election integrity; and
(c) provided Cooper of Global News with a July 2018 CSIS document that allegedly
(and incorrectly): (i) claimed that Chan favoured the interests of China, (ii) that
Chan provided political information to the Chinese consulate, and (iii) that Chan
had offered to attack other politicians who raised Chinese human rights issues.
37. The communications to the press of this secret official information relating to Chan was,
as intended, repeated by Fife and Cooper in the media, most notably in a Globe and Mail article dated February 13, 2023, in a Global News article dated February 24, 2023 and a further Globe and Mail article dated May 12, 2023. They have since been further republished by others and such
publication is ongoing.
38. Doe and Smith then proceeded in or about May 2023 to illegally leak further classified
information to Fife relating to an alleged classified electronic surveillance conducted on Chan by CSIS in 2019. They did so in the hope that this would keep the false allegations about Chan in the public eye and would lead the public to believe that Chan must be untrustworthy and of questionable loyalty. This illegal action by Doe and Smith resulted in a further publication by Fife in The Globe and Mail on May 19, 2023.
39. The actions by Doe and Smith in intentionally breaching the Security of Information Act
and targeting and seeking to damage Chan is an unlawful act pursuant to section 27 of the statute,
which provides that “an individual convicted of an offence under the Act is guilty of (a) an
indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 14 years; or (b) an offence
punishable on summary conviction and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 12
months or to a find of not more than $2,000, or both.”
40. It further constitutes misfeasance in public office.
41. Alternatively, Doe and Smith agreed to use unlawful acts (the breach of the Security of
Information Act) and such actions were directed at Chan (and other Canadian politicians of
Chinese ethnicity) in circumstances where they knew or ought to have known harm to Chan would
result.
42. The foregoing actions further constitute a conspiracy to injure.
(iii) Cooper – Unlawful Means Conspiracy
43. From at least 2019, Cooper engaged in an ongoing and relentless campaign against Chan
and has sought to portray Chan (a Canadian Citizen of over 50 years) as some sort of agent for the
Chinese government, and disloyal to Canada. Coopers efforts in this regard inter alia include
publishing an ongoing barrage of articles and posting Twitter comments regurgitating false CSISrelated and other unfounded allegations against Chan in a malicious, misleading and irresponsible
manner.
44. Sometime in late 2022 or 2023, Cooper cultivated Doe and Smith as sources.
45. Cooper was at all times aware of the provisions of the Security of Information Act, knew
that in his contacts with Doe and Smith referred to below, Doe and Smith were unlawfully
breaching the provisions of the Security of Information Act, and induced them to do so. He was also aware that there was a significant risk that security information provided by Doe and Smith was fundamentally frail and suspect, but was prepared, given his ongoing campaign against Chan, to disregard that risk.
46. Cooper conspired with Doe and Smith to cause them to commit an illegal act (the breach
of the Security of Information Act in their communications with him) and induced them to do so inter alia by agreeing to give them public dissemination of the CSIS intelligence information in a manner which would allow them to be anonymous. It was further understood that Cooper would portray this CSIS information about Chan as coming from a reputable source and hence as credible.
47. Cooper conspired with Doe and Smith with the intent that Chan would suffer damage given Cooper’s (unfounded) belief that Chan was an agent for a malevolent force. Cooper, Doe and Smith knew, or ought to have known, that in the circumstances, Chan would likely suffer damages.
48. Cooper also recognised that by putting a “face” (a Canadian politician of Chinese ancestry) to the possibility of Chinese government interference in the Canadian electoral process, he would take the story from being a general (and possibly somewhat abstract) story to one with an identified and targeted villain – and hence would give the story impact and generate more public attention for Cooper.
(iv) Fife – Unlawful Means Conspiracy
49. Fife has engaged in a separate conspiracy with Doe and Smith. His actions in furtherance
of the conspiracy have been taken separately from those of Cooper but involve the same material
elements as set out at paragraphs 44 -48 (with the references to “Cooper” in such paragraphs to be
replaced by Fife).
(v) Liability of Vigneault
50. Vigneault has the control and management of CSIS. As such, he has primary responsibility
to ensure compliance by CSIS employees with their statutory oath of secrecy and to ensure they
are not influenced by inappropriate racial stereotyping.
51. In this case, prior to the illegal actions of Doe and Smith directed at Chan, Vigneault was
aware:
(a) that CSIS secret official information as a result of its investigations was often based
on rumour, innuendo and subjective conjecture;
(b) if such speculative and unproven information was published in violation of the law,
a significant cross-section of the public would tend to believe such information
without understanding its factual frailties;
(c) the sharing of such information in violation of the law could cause harm to innocent
Canadians;
(d) CSIS employees had previously engaged in the sharing of CSIS investigative
information in violation of the law in an effort to smear the reputation of Canadian
citizens or permanent residents and had in fact caused such harm;
(e) there were segments of the press who were cozy with the intelligence community
and who would willingly act as a conduit for untested investigative information
(including the names of individuals) shared with them in order to curry favour with
sources in the intelligence community;
(f) in 2015 a CSIS employee (or ex-employee) had engaged in such misbehaviour with
respect to Chan;
(g) neither CSIS nor any other government authority had ever commenced any
proceeding claiming Chan had in any way violated any law of Canada and there
was, despite years of CSIS innuendo, no evidentiary basis for any such proceedings;
(h) given that there was no actual evidence, and in the polarised political environment
pertaining to matters related to China, that there was a real risk that CSIS employees
might once again engage in the familiar tactic of the intelligence community in
sharing with the press alleged “intelligence” about Chan in an effort to smear him
again with anonymous (and fanciful) accusations;
(i) there were elements within CSIS or the Canadian broader intelligence community
who wished their views on Chinese-Canadian politicians (including Chan) to be
given credibility by uninformed and irresponsible press publications of such views;
(j) there had already been by November of 2022 illegal leaks to the press by
government officials of CSIS secret official information allegedly referencing
election interference by the Chinese government with the alleged assistance of
“operatives” and “agents”;
(k) systemic racism existed and exists in CSIS and the sharing of CSIS secret official
information relating to Canadian politicians of Chinese ethnicity was thus a
heightened risk;
(l) systemic racism towards Asians exists in segments of Canadian society who might
be willing to latch onto innuendo that Chan was somehow less of a Canadian than
others; and
(m) it was therefore imperative that all steps be taken to insure that CSIS secret official
information pertaining to Canadian politicians of Chinese ethnicity (including
Chan) not be shared by CSIS employees in violation of the law.
52. Vigneault in fact negligently failed to take appropriate steps to ensure there were no illegal
sharing of secret official information pertaining to Chan in violation of the law.
(vi) Liability of the Crown, the Attorney General and CSIS
53. The Crown, the Attorney General and CSIS are liable for the tortious actions of Doe and
Smith and the negligence of Vigneault under The Crown Liability and Proceedings Act.
54. Additionally, a significant part of Doe’s and Smith’s employment with CSIS and the
Crown involved access to, possession of, and dissemination of, official secret information. CSIS and the Crown were and are institutionally best placed to prevent their employees from illegally communicating such information to others.
C. Damages
55. Chan is justifiably proud of his Chinese heritage. But he is first and foremost a Canadian.
He has devoted a good portion of his working life to public service to his country.
56. As a result of the misfeasance in public office of Doe and Smith and their conspiracies with Cooper and Fife (for which His Majesty, the Attorney General and CSIS are responsible), Chan has suffered pain, embarrassment, humiliation, stress and damage to his reputation, and well as threats to his personal wellbeing and that of his family. It has particularly pained him to know that his family members have had to deal with this matter.
57. Chan has suffered real and permanent damage and asks this Court for a fair award of
damages.
58. The Plaintiff proposes this action be tried in Toronto, Ontario
原告方：陈国治（”陈”）是约克地区的议员和万锦市副市长。他曾是安大略省议员，自2007年以来连任三次当选Markham-Unionville选区的议员。他于2007年2月首次被任命为安大略省政府的内阁部长，并在多个内阁职位上忠诚地工作过。
被告方：加拿大安全情报局（Canadian Security Intelligence Service，简称CSIS）是根据《加拿大安全情报法》（Canadian Security Intelligence Act, R.S.C. 1984）成立的政府机构，其职责是协助保护加拿大的国家安全，并且要按照法治原则并尊重加拿大权利与自由宪章执行其职责和职能。
被告方：大卫·维尼奥（David Vigneault），是CSIS的局长，负责管理和控制CSIS及其所有相关事项，包括对其员工和就业政策的监督。
被告方：泄密者，Doe和Smith的真实姓名和身份不得而知。在确定他们的身份之前，使用伪名来表示。Doe和Smith是CSIS的雇员，是”公职人员”。他们工作的一个重要和必要部分是创建、审查和传播（符合法律规定）秘密官员。 可以接触到CSIS产生的报告和秘密官方信息。
被告方：Cooper和Fife，Sam Cooper（以下简称“Cooper”）是环球新闻的在线调查记者。在过去几年里，Cooper努力确立自己是中国裔加拿大人事务的专家，特别是关于中国政府在加拿大社会中施加不当影响的所谓努力。Cooper还出现在许多播客或其他广播节目中，宣扬这些观点。
Fife是《环球邮报》的员工。他也与从事加拿大情报界工作或与之打交道的人建立了关系，并曾被他们用作报告泄露的（不准确的）机密信息的渠道。Fife过去曾充当非法泄露机密（和虚假）信息的渠道。
原告的主张为：
(a) 对被告方，要求赔偿一般性和加重性损害赔偿，金额为9,000,000元；
(b) 对John Doe（以下简称“Doe”）、Jane Smith（以下简称“Smith”）、Sam Cooper（以下简称“Cooper”）和Robert Fife（以下简称“Fife”）要求赔偿惩罚性损害赔偿，金额为1,000,000元；
(c) 根据安大略省法院法（Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c C43）修订前后的规定，要求法院给予判决前和判决后的利息；
(d) 要求被告支付本诉讼的诉讼费，以实质赔偿的方式，并附加相应的税款（HST）；
(e) 请求法院授予其他进一步的救济措施，以及法院认为公正的其他救济措施。
A. 概述
2. 如下所述，自2022年11月至2023年5月期间，加拿大政府的雇员John Doe和Jane Smith（具有访问机密信息和文件的资格）在某些媒体成员的协助和鼓励下，长期参与违反信息安全法（Security of Information Act）的活动，非法披露（即泄露）机密信息。他们这样做（被告方Cooper和Fife也鼓励和诱导他们这样做），知道他们的非法行为将给华裔加拿大政治家，如Michael Chan，带来伤害，而这些政治家一直是泄露信息的目标。他们（以及被告方Cooper和Fife）泄露这些信息，明知这些信息往往是根据猜测和主观解释得出的，而这些信息具有误导性。
他们这样做是为了将自己的利益置于加拿大更广泛的利益之上，而没有考虑到他们的非法行为会对陈本人造成非常重大的伤害。
B. 各方当事人
(i) 原告方
3. 原告方陈国治（”陈”）是约克地区的议员和万锦市副市长。他曾是安大略省议员，自2007年以来连任三次当选Markham-Unionville选区的议员。他于2007年2月首次被任命为安大略省政府的内阁部长，并在多个内阁职位上忠诚地工作过。
4. 陈在中国出生，青年时期在香港和澳门度过。他年轻时来加拿大，寻求更好的生活。他当时不会讲英语，努力在新的国家中立足。最终，通过辛勤工作，他成为一位成功的商人。他实现了更好的生活。他是数百万移民的一个例子，在过去几十年里，他们受益于这个国家的繁荣发展，并通过他们的努力帮助这个国家更加繁荣。
(ii) 政府被告方
5. 加拿大安全情报局（Canadian Security Intelligence Service，简称CSIS）是根据《加拿大安全情报法》（Canadian Security Intelligence Act, R.S.C. 1984）成立的政府机构，其职责是协助保护加拿大的国家安全，并且要按照法治原则并尊重加拿大权利与自由宪章执行其职责和职能。
6. 被告方大卫·维尼奥（David Vigneault）是CSIS的局长，负责管理和控制CSIS及其所有相关事项，包括对其员工和就业政策的监督。
7. 加拿大国王陛下（”王室”）是根据《王室责任和诉讼法》（The Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-50）第3条的规定，对王室代理人和公务员（包括员工）犯下的侵权行为负责的法律主体。
8. 加拿大总检察长根据《王室责任和诉讼法》第23条被列为被告方。
9. 原告方陈对被告方Doe和Smith的真实姓名和身份不得而知。在确定他们的身份之前，使用伪名来表示。
10. 在相关时期，Doe和Smith是CSIS的雇员，是”公职人员”。他们工作的一个重要和必要部分是创建、审查和传播（符合法律规定）秘密官
11. 根据《加拿大安全情报法》第10条的规定，Doe和Smith已经作出并受到法定的保密誓言的约束，承诺如下：
我，[姓名]，发誓在没有正当授权的情况下，不会向任何人透露或向任何人披露我在代表或根据加拿大安全情报局的指示或根据我根据加拿大安全情报法所担任的任何职务或雇佣所获得的信息。愿上帝帮助我。
作为第10-11款的替代方案，Doe和Smith是加拿大政府其他部门的雇员，可以接触到CSIS产生的报告和秘密官方信息。
12. (iii) 被告方Cooper和Fife
13. 被告方Sam Cooper（以下简称“Cooper”）是环球新闻的在线调查记者。在过去几年里，Cooper努力确立自己是中国裔加拿大人事务的专家，特别是关于中国政府在加拿大社会中施加不当影响的所谓努力。Cooper还出现在许多播客或其他广播节目中，宣扬这些观点。
14. Cooper经常把来自与情报来源有关或声称与之有关的人士的未经验证的信息重复传播为真相。这反过来帮助他与从事加拿大情报界工作或与之打交道的人建立关系，以及那些希望通过公开平台推进他们所相信或主张的理论或怀疑的人。
15. Fife是《环球邮报》的员工。他也与从事加拿大情报界工作或与之打交道的人建立了关系，并曾被他们用作报告泄露的（不准确的）机密信息的渠道。Fife过去曾充当非法泄露机密（和虚假）信息的渠道。特别是，关于加拿大政府官员在马赫尔·阿拉尔事件中的行动的司法委员会调查发现，“加拿大（情报）官员长期以来选择性地向媒体泄露”有关一位加拿大公民的机密信息，并且媒体将这些信息重复报道为明显可信的信息。这份司法报告中所提到的“媒体”包括Fife接收并知道这些泄露是非法的情况下重复报道的泄露信息。
13. C. 背景事实
(i) CSIS对陈国治的过去处理
16. 作为一个组织，CSIS在法律上要求保持政治中立，其公职人员必须遵守法定的保密誓言和《保密信息法》（Security of Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. O-5），包括第4(1)(a)条，该条规定向他人传达托付给其保密的秘密官方信息是犯罪行为。
17. CSIS的情报收集活动的性质决定了它经常接收关于加拿大公民的信息，这些信息基于谣言、暗示或其他具有可疑证据价值的信息，在法庭上可能不被接受。此外，某些信息来源可能具有私人或政治议程或观点，这引发了与其所提供信息的可信度相关的问题。最后，这些信息是通过主观的过程加工而成的。
18. 因此，CSIS产生的信息或报告常常是脆弱和可疑的。因此，非常重要的是以最严格的保密处理这些信息。事实上，如果CSIS生成的信息被发布、非正式发布或以其他方式泄露给公众，将可能对加拿大的整体利益和那些可能与该信息相关的人造成重大的损害和不利影响。此外，公众的一部分人会倾向于相信这些信息在事实上是可信的，因为它们与CSIS有关联。
19. 在法定保密誓言和《保密信息法》中嵌入的保密和非传播规定等提供了对加拿大公民的保护，确保他们不会因为CSIS或其他政府官员传达官方信息或基于其调查信息的任何CSIS观点而受到伤害。
20. 但这并不总是这样。CSIS和其他公职人员（包括高级官员）有时会有意违反法律要求，以推动个人观点和利益，或他人的观点、利益和议程。
21. 特别是在2010年，当时的CSIS局长Richard Fadden（以下简称“Fadden”）公开传播了一个模糊、笼统的暗示，声称CSIS掌握了一些（未具名的）加拿大内阁部长（在加拿大以外出生）被认为受到外国政府影响的信息（暗示这个外国政府是中国）。
22. 那时，陈国治是安大略省内阁的一名部长。
23. Fadden轻率地对来自中国移民的加拿大政治家进行诋毁受到广泛谴责，包括媒体称其为“愚蠢的”、“鲁莽的”和“矛盾的”。相关的议会监督委员会（“公共安全和国家安全常设委员会”）发现“Fadden通过他没有证据支持的指控播下了怀疑和焦虑。在委员会的看法中，Fadden严重损害了加拿大选定官员的声誉”。
24. 因此，议会委员会建议解雇Fadden。
25. 受到这种公开谴责的打击，并且不愿放弃无根据的观点，2015年，一名身份不明的CSIS官员（或前官员）违反法律告诉The Globe and Mail，2010年Fadden所提到的一位政治家中，被指涉受到“外国影响”的人物之一是陈国治。如其意图，The Globe and Mail在2015年继续发表文章，暗示CSIS的信息是可信的，并暗示陈国治对加拿大构成某种威胁。
26. 再次强调，从未提供任何证据来支持这个没有根据的2015年的暗示。CSIS从未采访过陈国治，而陈国治的名字只是被CSIS与媒体一起恶意诋毁。
27. (ii) Doe和Smith：违法行为和公职不当行为
在2022年底至2023年初，Doe和Smith决定重复之前一些CSIS或其他加拿大政府雇员使用的策略，针对具有中国族裔的加拿大政治家。
28. 作为公职人员，Doe和Smith始终受到《保密信息法》的约束，该法律规定，向其他人传达他们以保密方式获得的官方机密信息是一种违法行为，这些信息是由任何国王陛下职位下的人士或由于他们作为任职人员或曾任职人员的身份而向他们托付的。
29. Doe和Smith意识到他们的法定保密誓言和《保密信息法》的规定，但故意违反了下面所述的这两项规定。通过这样做，他们犯下了违法行为。
30. 具体而言，Doe和Smith有意向媒体成员传达，并与他们分享了有关CSIS调查中国政府涉嫌活动、其与具有中国族裔的加拿大政治家的所谓互动，以及关于这些问题的对加拿大政府的机密简报的官方机密信息。
31. 接着，Doe和Smith向媒体披露了一些具有中国族裔的加拿大政治家，声称他们各自是CSIS调查的对象，并报道（不准确地）他们所谓的行动。他们这样做是希望引起公众的关注，并在加拿大民众心中播下对这些政治家是否可信的不确定性。
32. 到2023年2月，Doe和Smith违法泄露官方机密信息给Global News的Cooper已经在公众心中植入了这样一种观点，即CSIS认为中国政府给（自由党）候选人提供了25万加元现金，大多伦多地区存在一个“网络”由“特工”组成，这个网络在推进中国共产党的目标，并且中国“特工”正在协助加拿大政治候选人。
33. 在外国政府通过（最初未具名的）特工涉嫌进行的广泛非法干涉的背景下，Doe和Smith直接将目标对准了陈国治。
34. Doe和Smith分享CSIS的情报信息，意图使这些信息被媒体再次发布，从而在个人和声誉上损害陈国治，他们（错误地）认为陈国治对加拿大不忠诚或构成威胁。
35. 更广泛地说，他们的行为受到对在中国出生的移民的刻板印象的影响，认为他们在某种程度上不值得信任。
36. 作为对加拿大华裔政治家的更广泛攻击的一部分，Doe和Smith选择有意向媒体传达（无论是个别还是集体）关于陈国治的信息：
(a) 向The Globe and Mail的Fife传达了（无根据和不准确的）CSIS某些部分的观点，即陈国治与可能代表中国政府的“情报行动人员”在“与选举相关”的事务上不当联络，并且陈国治在（机密）向联邦政府提供的情报简报中被提及；
(b) 向Global News的Cooper传达以下信息：（i）陈国治是CSIS的“目标”，（ii）CSIS的信息是陈国治是自由党的“政治操纵者”，并且以某种方式“策划”了将一个候选人替换为据称受到中国政府青睐的候选人，（iii）陈国治向中国驻多伦多领事馆提供了（未指明的）“政治信息”，（iv）陈国治的行动威胁了加拿大的选举公正性；
(c) 向Global News的Cooper提供了一份据称（但事实不然）是2018年7月的CSIS文件，其中声称：（i）陈国治支持中国的利益，（ii）陈国治向中国领事馆提供政治信息，（iii）陈国治曾提出攻击提出中国人权问题的其他政治家的意愿。
37. 这些涉及陈国治的秘密官方信息的传达给媒体，如计划所愿，被Fife和Cooper在媒体上反复报道，尤其是在《The Globe and Mail》2023年2月13日的一篇文章中，在Global News 2023年2月24日的一篇文章中，以及在《The Globe and Mail》2023年5月12日的另一篇文章中。此后，这些信息被其他人进一步转载，这种转载仍在继续进行。
38. Doe和Smith随后于2023年5月左右违法泄露了进一步与2019年CSIS对陈国治进行的涉密电子监视有关的信息给Fife。他们这样做是希望保持对陈国治的虚假指控在公众中的关注，并使公众相信陈国治必定是不可信任的并且忠诚性值得怀疑。Doe和Smith的这种非法行为导致了Fife于2023年5月19日在《The Globe and Mail》上的进一步发布。
39. Doe和Smith故意违反《保密信息法》，并针对并试图损害陈国治的行为属于该法规第27条规定的非法行为。该法规规定：“在该法规下犯罪的个人将被视为（a）重罪，可判处不超过14年的监禁；或（b）可判处简易刑不超过12个月的犯罪，或罚款不超过2,000加元，或两者兼施。”
40. 这进一步构成公职不当行使。
41. 或者，Doe和Smith同意使用非法手段（违反《保密信息法》），并且这些行为针对陈国治（和其他加拿大华裔政治家），在他们知道或应该知道这将给陈国治带来伤害的情况下进行。
42. 上述行为还构成了一起故意损害的阴谋。
(iii) Cooper – 非法手段的阴谋
43. 从2019年开始，Cooper进行了一场持续不断的、无情而无休止的对陈国治的攻击，并试图将陈国治（一个拥有50多年加拿大公民身份的人）描绘成中国政府的代理人，并对加拿大不忠诚。Cooper在这方面的努力包括发表一系列文章和发布推特评论，以恶意、误导和不负责任的方式重复发表与CSIS相关以及其他毫无根据的针对陈国治的指控。
44. 在2022年末或2023年的某个时候，Cooper将Doe和Smith培养成消息来源。
45. Cooper始终清楚《保密信息法》的规定，并知道在与下文提到的Doe和Smith的接触中，他们正在非法违反《保密信息法》的规定，并诱使他们这样做。他还知道Doe和Smith提供的安全信息可能是根本不可靠和可疑的，但考虑到他对陈国治的持续攻击，他愿意忽视这种风险。
46. Cooper与Doe和Smith共谋，促使他们犯下非法行为（与他的沟通中违反《保密信息法》），并通过同意以让他们能够匿名地公开传播CSIS情报信息的方式来诱使他们这样做。此外，他们还了解到，Cooper将把有关陈国治的CSIS信息描绘成来自可靠消息源，因此具有可信性。
47. Cooper与Doe和Smith共谋，意图使陈国治受到损害，因为Cooper（毫无根据地）认为陈国治是一股恶势力的代理人。Cooper、Doe和Smith知道或应该知道，在这种情况下，陈国治可能会遭受损失。
48. Cooper还意识到，通过将“面孔”（一个具有中国血统的加拿大政治家）与中国政府干预加拿大选举过程的可能性联系起来，他将把这个故事从一个普遍的（可能有些抽象的）故事变成一个具有明确和有针对性的恶棍的故事——因此，将给这个故事带来影响力并引起更多公众关注。
49. (iv) Fife – 非法手段的阴谋
49. Fife与Doe和Smith参与了另一起阴谋。他为推进阴谋而采取的行动与Cooper的行动是分开进行的，但涉及到与第44-48段所列相同的实质要素（在这些段落中，“Cooper”的提及应更换为“Fife”）。
50. (v) Vigneault的责任
50. Vigneault拥有对CSIS的控制和管理。因此，他对确保CSIS员工遵守法定保密誓言并确保他们不受不恰当的种族刻板印象影响负有首要责任。
51. 在本案中，在Doe和Smith针对陈国治的非法行为之前，Vigneault知道：
(a) CSIS的秘密官方信息往往是基于传闻、暗示和主观揣测的结果；
(b) 如果这种推测性和未经证实的信息违法发布，很多公众往往会相信这些信息，而不了解它们的事实脆弱性；
(c) 违反法律分享这种信息可能对无辜的加拿大人造成伤害；
(d) CSIS员工此前曾违反法律分享CSIS调查信息，试图诽谤加拿大公民或永久居民的声誉，并实际上造成了这种伤害；
(e) 有一些媒体与情报界关系密切，愿意充当未经验证的调查信息（包括个人姓名）的传递者，以取悦情报界的消息来源；
(f) 2015年，一名CSIS员工（或前员工）在涉及陈国治的事情上曾经参与过这样的不端行为；
(g) 无论是CSIS还是其他政府机构都从未启动过任何诉讼，声称陈国治以任何方式违反了加拿大的任何法律，尽管经过多年的CSIS暗示，也没有任何证据基础支持这种诉讼；
(h) 鉴于没有实际证据，以及与与中国有关事务相关的两极分化的政治环境，CSIS员工有可能再次采用情报界常见的策略，与媒体分享关于陈国治的所谓“情报”，以匿名（而荒诞）的指控再次诽谤他；
(i) CSIS或加拿大更广泛的情报界内部存在希望其对华裔政治家（包括陈国治）的看法通过未经事实核实和不负责任的媒体报道获得可信度的成员；
(j) 到2022年11月，已经有政府官员向媒体非法泄露了涉及中国政府通过所谓的“特工”和“代理人”进行选举干预的CSIS秘密官方信息；
(k) CSIS存在系统性种族主义，分享与加拿大华裔政治家有关的CSIS秘密官方信息因此存在更高的风险；
(L) 加拿大社会中存在对亚洲人的系统性种族主义，这些人可能愿意接受关于陈国治在某种程度上不如其他人成为加拿大人的暗示；
因此，必须采取一切措施确保CSIS员工不违反法律分享与加拿大华裔政治家（包括陈国治）有关的CSIS秘密官方信息。
52.事实上，Vigneault疏忽地未采取适当措施，确保没有非法分享涉及陈德权的秘密官方信息违反了法律。
(vi) 皇家、总检察长和CSIS的责任
根据《皇家责任和诉讼法》，皇家、总检察长和CSIS对Doe和Smith的侵权行为以及Vigneault的过失行为负有责任。
此外，Doe和Smith在CSIS和皇家的工作中，重要部分涉及获得、持有和传播官方秘密信息。CSIS和皇家作为机构，在预防员工非法传递此类信息给他人方面处于最佳位置，过去和现在都是如此。
C. 损害赔偿
55. 陈国治对自己的中国血统感到自豪，但他首先是一个加拿大人。他将自己的职业生涯中的大部分时间都献给了为国家提供公共服务。
56. 由于Doe和Smith在公职行为上的过失以及他们与Cooper和Fife的共谋（皇家、总检察长和CSIS负有责任），陈国治遭受了痛苦、尴尬、羞辱、压力和声誉损害，以及对他个人和家人福祉的威胁。他尤其痛苦的是，他的家人不得不应对这个问题。
57. 陈国治遭受了实际和永久性的伤害，并要求法院公正地给予赔偿。
58. 原告建议在安大略省多伦多进行此诉讼。
中文版由媒体自行翻译，仅供参考，不负法律责任，如有不同，以英文原文为准
